politics (the "de Tocqueville argument") or as an ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, circumscribed within agglomerations of sovereign territories. Although both explanations are potentially divisive, they have, through examples like George Kennan's infamous "X" article, been unproblematically unifi ed. More crucially, even the image of a Western and Eastern bloc that reconfi gures the European-Non-European distinction along ideological lines deliberately obscures and confuses cartographic renditions of the world that still persist along these cultural axes. Thus what one gets out of a conventional map of the Cold War are a series of messy and incommensurable spaces: the ideological West versus the East, the colonial cultural Orient versus the Occident, which then are mapped onto the "three worlds" model through some developmentalist hierarchy. Simultaneously outside these spaces exist a number of other realms that are diffi cult to position: the double inscription of nationalism and communism, the attempt to insert "neutral zones" in between a world split according to the free world/communist world or core/periphery distinctions.
Taking a leaf out of the problem of ambivalence in the role of space/ spatiality in the Cold War, the subject that concerns this chapterSingapore's People's Action Party's (PAP) expulsion/resignation from the Socialist International in 1976-provides a number of instructive ways in which space and geography (as well as one's imagination of them) could present an interesting case for refl ection. While the event in itself has received little academic attention and has registered much less on the radar of Western Cold War narratives, its peripherality offers some possibilities in reconsidering how spatiality could be reworked into an account of the Cold War. First, the nature of the dispute between the PAP and the Socialist International has most commonly been seen as a dispute over the nature and meaning of democratic socialism and whether or not the PAP, as Singapore's ruling party, had gone against its avowed democratic creed and if it had, to all intents and purposes, become capitalist. As such, the incident more specifi cally suggested ideational issues within one particular bloc in the Cold War, rather than a crisis of geopolitical or strategic magnitude. Second, when examined closely enough, one notices certain issues of spatiality that do disturb conventional framings of the Cold War. From Lee Kuan Yew's pontifi cations on socialism in the 1960s and the PAP's offi cial policy on socialism in 1972, and from the party's departure from the Socialist International up until the inauguration of the Asian Values debate in the early 1990s, the positions taken by the PAP with regard to socialism demonstrated attempts to constantly rework the notions of Asia, "the West," communism, and even socialism itself. By doing so, the distinct geography presented by these notions disrupt the conventional discourse of
